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ABSTRACT 
In multi-hop wireless systems, the need for cooperation among nodes to relay each other's packets 
exposes them to a wide range of security attacks. A particularly devastating attack is the wormhole 
attack, where a malicious node records control traffic at one location and tunnels it to another 
compromised node, possibly far away, which replays it locally. Routing security in ad hoc networks is 
often equated with strong and feasible node authentication and lightweight cryptography. Unfortunately, 
the wormhole attack can hardly be defeated by crypto graphical measures, as wormhole attackers do not 
create separate packets. They simply replay packets already existing on the network, which pass the 
cryptographic checks. Existing works on wormhole detection have often focused on detection using 
specialized hardware, such as directional antennas, etc. In this paper, we present a cluster based 
counter-measure for the wormhole attack, that alleviates these drawbacks and efficiently mitigates the 
wormhole attack in MANET. Simulation results on MATLab exhibit the effectiveness of the proposed 
algorithm in detecting wormhole attacks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile wireless ad hoc networks are fundamentally different from wired networks, as they use 
wireless medium to communicate, do not rely on fixed infrastructure, and can arrange them into 
a network quickly and efficiently. In a Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET), each node serves as 
a router for other nodes, which allows data to travel, utilizing multi-hop network paths, beyond 
the line of sight without relying on wired infrastructure. Security in such networks, however, is 
a great concern [1, 2, 7, 8]. The open nature of the wireless medium makes it easy for outsiders 
to listen to network traffic or interfere with it. Lack of centralized control authority makes 
deployment of traditional centralized security mechanisms difficult, if not impossible. Lack of 
clear network entry points also makes it difficult to implement perimeter-based defense 
mechanisms such as firewalls. Finally, in a MANET nodes might be battery-powered and might 
have very limited resources, which may make the use of heavy-weight security solutions 
undesirable [2, 3, 7, 8, 13].  
A wormhole attack is a particularly severe attack on MANET routing where two attackers, 
connected by a high-speed off-channel link, are strategically placed at different ends of a 
network, as shown in figure 1. These attackers then record the wireless data they overhear, 
forward it to each other, and replay the packets at the other end of the network. Replaying valid 
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network messages at improper places, wormhole attackers can make far apart nodes believe they 
are immediate neighbors, and force all communications between affected nodes to go through 
them.  
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Figure 1: MANET with a wormhole attack 
In general, ad hoc routing protocols fall into two categories: proactive routing protocol that 
relies on periodic transmission of routing packets updates, and on-demand routing protocols that 
search for routes only when necessary.  A wormhole attack is equally worse a threat for both 
proactive and on-demand routing protocols [3, 7, 8, 9]. 
When a proactive routing protocol [10] is used, ad hoc network nodes send periodic HELLO 
messages to each other indicating their participation in the network. In Figure 2, when node S 
sends a HELLO message, intruder M1 forwards it to the other end of the network, and node H 
hears this HELLO message. Since H can hear a HELLO message from S, it assumes itself and 
node S to be direct neighbors. Thus, if H wants to forward anything to S, it may do so 
unknowingly through the wormhole link. This effectively allows the wormhole attackers full 
control of the communication link. 
In case of on-demand routing protocols, such as AODV [11], when a node wants to 
communicate with another node, it floods its neighbors with requests, trying to determine a path 
to the destination. In figure 2, if S wants to communicate with H, it sends out a request. A 
wormhole, once again, forwards such request without change to the other end of the network, 
may be directly to node H. A request also travels along the network in a proper way, so H is 
lead to believe it has a possible route to node S thru the wormhole attacker nodes. If this route is 
selected by the route discovery protocol, once again wormhole attackers get full control of the 
traffic between S and H. Once the wormhole attackers have control of a link, attackers can drop 
the packets to be forwarded by their link. They can drop all packets, a random portion of 
packets, or specifically targeted packets1. Attackers can also forward packets out of order or 
‘switch’ their link on and off [3]. 
In this paper, we have proposed an algorithm where intrusion detection has been done in a 
cluster based approach to detect the wormhole attacks. The AODV routing protocol is used as 
the underlying network topology. A two layer approach is used for detecting whether a node is 
acting as a wormhole.     
2. RELATED WORKS 
Routing security in ad hoc networks is often equated with strong and feasible node 
authentication and lightweight cryptography. A wide variety of secure extensions to existing 
routing protocols have been proposed over the years. However, the majority of these protocols 
are focused on using crypto graphical solutions to prevent unauthorized nodes from creating 
seemingly valid packets [8]. Unfortunately, the wormhole attack can not be defeated by crypto 
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graphical measures, as wormhole attackers do not create separate packets - they simply replay 
packets already existing on the network, which pass all cryptographic checks. Perhaps the most 
commonly cited wormhole prevention mechanism is ‘packet leashes’ by Hu et al [13]. Hu 
proposed to add secure ‘leash’ containing timing and/or Global Positioning System (GPS) 
information to each packet on a hop-by-hop basis. Based on the information contained in a 
packet leash, a node receiving the packet would be able to determine whether the packet has 
traveled a distance larger than physically possible. 
Hu proposed two different kinds of leashes: geographical leashes and temporal leashes. 
Geographic leashes require each node to have access to up-to-date GPS information, and rely on 
loose (in the order of ms) clock synchronization. When geographical leashes are used, a node 
sending a packet appends to it the time the packet is sent ts and its location ps. A receiving node 
uses its own location pr and the time it receives a packet tr to determine the distance the packet 
could have traveled. Keeping in mind maximum possible node velocity v, clock synchronization 
error ∆, and possible GPS distance error ∆, the distance between the sender and the receiver dsr 
is upper-bounded by: 
dsr <||ps - pr||+2v(tr - ts+∆)+∆ 
Geographical leashes should work fine when GPS coordinates are practical and available. 
However, modern GPS technology has significant limitations that should not be overlooked. 
While the price of GPS devices is going down, it remains substantial. Besides, GPS is somewhat 
of a nuisance for personal laptops. Also, while, as Hu [13, 3] specifies, it is possible to achieve 
GPS precision of about 3m with state-of-the-art GPS devices, consumer-level devices do not get 
(and do not require) this level of resolution. Finally, GPS systems are not versatile, as GPS 
devices do not function well inside buildings, under water, in the presence of strong magnetic 
radiation, etc. As opposed to geographical leashes, temporal leashes require much tighter clock 
synchronization (in the order of nanoseconds), but do not rely on GPS information. When 
temporal leashes are used, the sending node specifies the time it sends a packet ts in a packet 
leash, and the receiving node uses its own packet reception time tr for verification. In a slightly 
different version of temporal packet leashes, the sending node calculates an expiration time te 
after which a packet should not be accepted, and puts that information in the leash. This is to 
prevent a packet from traveling farther than distance L 
te = ts+L/C-∆, where, C is the speed of light and ∆ is the maximum clock 
synchronization error. 
Another set of wormhole prevention techniques, somewhat similar to temporal packet leashes 
[10], is based on the time of flight of individual packets. Wormhole attacks are possible because 
an attacker can make two far-apart nodes see themselves as neighbors. One possible way to 
prevent wormholes, as used by Capkun et al [14], Hu et al [15], Hong et al [4], and Korkmaz 
[5], is to measure round-trip travel time of a message and its acknowledgement, estimate the 
distance between the nodes based on this travel time, and determine whether the calculated 
distance is within the maximum possible communication range. The basis of all these 
approaches is the following. The Round Trip Travel Time (RTT) δ of a message in a wireless 
medium can, theoretically, be related to the distance d between nodes, assuming that the 
wireless signal travels with a speed of light c:  
d =(δc)/2 and δ=2d/c 
The neighbor status of nodes is verified if d is within the radio transmission range R  for R > d 
(d within transmission range): R >δc/2 and δ<2R/c. In essence, the use of RTT eliminates the 
need for tight clock synchronization required in temporal leashes: a node only uses its own 
clock to measure time. However, this approach, while accounting for message propagation, 
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completely ignores message processing time. When a message is sent by one node and is 
acknowledged by another, the time it takes for a node to process a message and to reply to it is 
generally non-negligible, particularly in the context of bounding short distances using signals 
whose speed is similar to that of light in vacuum. After all, it takes the light less than 0.2 
seconds to circle the entire Earth around the equator. Outstanding clock precision and 
practically nonexistent errors are required to bind distances on the order of hundreds of meters.  
Several researchers worked on the wormhole attack problem by treating a wormhole as a 
misbehaving link. In such approaches, a wormhole attack is not specifically identified. Rather, 
the wormhole’s destructive behavior is mitigated. Baruch [6] and Chigan [12] use link rating 
schemes to prevent blackhole and wormhole attacks. They both rely on authenticated 
acknowledgements of data packets to rate links: if a link is dropping packets, the 
acknowledgements do not get through; link is rated low and avoided in the future. These 
approaches are geared towards discovery and prevention of only one kind of wormhole 
behavior: packet loss. Wormholes can do much more than that: they can send packets out of 
order, confuse location-based schemes, or simply aggregate packets for traffic analysis. Even 
the distortion of topology information that a wormhole introduce can be a significant problem in 
particular networks. The real problem with the wormholes is that unauthorized nodes (wormhole 
attackers) are able to transmit valid network messages. Techniques based on links’ performance 
may be suitable in certain cases, but they do not fully address the wormhole problem. 
In one of our earlier works, [1] a new collaborative algorithm called IDSX had been proposed. 
The proposed IDSX offers an extended architecture and is compatible with heterogeneous IDS 
already deployed in the participating nodes. In the high level of the architecture of the IDSX 
mechanism, the cluster heads act as the links across different clusters. The cluster heads are 
IDSX enabled and hence, can utilize alerts to generate the alarms. Alerts represent the potential 
security breaches as identified by local IDS active nodes. The IDSX nodes are authorized to 
take the final decision of discarding a node after aggregating and correlating the alerts that has 
been generated over a period of time.  
3. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
Our objective is to find out the malicious node that performs the wormhole attack in network. 
We have assumed that the MANET consists of clusters of nodes. The assumptions regarding the 
organization of the MANET are listed in section 3.1. 
3.1 Assumptions  
The following assumptions are taken in order to design the proposed algorithm. 
1. A node interacts with its 1-hop neighbors directly and with other nodes via intermediate 
nodes using multi-hop packet forwarding. 
2. Every node has a unique id in the network, which is assigned to a new node collaboratively 
by existing nodes. 
3.  The entire network is geographically divided into a few disjoint or overlapping clusters 
4.  The network is considered to be layered. 
5.  A cluster head at the inner layer is represented as CH (1,i), where 1 signifies inner Layer, and 
i stands for the cluster number 
6.  Each cluster is monitored by only one cluster head (monitoring node). 
7.  The cluster membership is restricted up to 2 hops. 
3.2 Cluster formation  
In this paper, we have proposed an algorithm where intrusion detection has been done in a 
cluster based manner to take care of the wormhole attacks. The AODV routing protocol is used 
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as the underlying network topology. A two layer approach is used for detecting whether a node 
is participating in a wormhole attack. The layered approach is introduced to reduce the load of 
processing on each cluster heads. From security point of view, this will also reduce the risk of a 
cluster head being compromised.  
The entire network is divided in clusters as in figure 2.  The clusters may be overlapped or 
disjoint. Each cluster has its own cluster head and a number of nodes designated as member 
nodes. Member nodes pass on the information only to the cluster head. The cluster-head is 
responsible for passing on the aggregate information to all its members. The cluster head is 
elected dynamically and maintains the routing information.   
GN is the guard node, used for monitoring the malicious activity.  The main purpose of the 
guard node is to guard the cluster from possible attacks. The guard node has the power to 
monitor the activity of any node within the cluster. The guard node reports to the cluster head of 
the respective layer in case a malicious activity is detected. A cluster head in the inner layer 
(CH1,i) detects a malicious activity and informs the cluster head CH2 of the outer layer to take 
appropriate action. It’s the duty of (CH1,i) to check  the number of false routes generated by any 
node. The cluster head CH2 of outer layer takes upon itself the responsibility of informing all 
nodes of the inner layer about the malicious node.  
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layer 1, which is denoted as CH (1,i). CH(1,i) informs cluster head at layer 2 (CH2 ), about the 
malicious node. CH2 broadcast this information to all cluster heads at layer 1.  The cluster heads 
at layer 1 inform their respective cluster members.  
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Figure 3: Cluster Based Detection Technique  
 
In figure 3,  node S sends a HELLO packet for destination node D. S has a path to D via (2, 3). 
M1, being in the proximity of S, overhears the HELLO message and forwards the same to node 
M2 in the other end of the network. Node D hears this HELLO message from S and therefore 
considers S to be its immediate neighbor and follow the route to send message to S via M1 and 
M2. The node 3 which is at the overlapping position of two cluster acts as GUARD node who 
can here every packet send by node S for the destination node D and monitor the packets route 
from souce to destination. The guard node is also called monitoring node. When S observes 
some malicious behavior when it sends packet to D it informs the guard node. The guard node 
then checks the number of packets send for the node D and those actually received by D from S. 
Then it calculates ∆p = PKTSNT(S, D) - PKTRCD (S, D). If the value of ∆p surmounts the 
threshold value that is predefined by the monitoring node then monitoring node finds out the 
wormhole attack. 
Procedure WormHoleDetection 
Begin 
Step 1: Initiate the network with two cluster and each cluster have some nodes. 
Step 2: The node within a cluster having minimum node ID becomes Cluster Head.  The 
node ID for each node is provided when the node enter into the cluster. 
Step 4: Each node stores  the  information of its immediate neighbors in its neighbor table. 
Step 5: The node nearest to both the cluster heads at layer 1 is chosen as the guard node. 
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Step 7: Source node S sends a HELLO packet to the intermediate node with destination 
node ID and cluster ID 
          Step 7.1: S starts timer, initializes T1 
      Step 7.2: S increments the PKTCNT(S, D) 
          Step 7.3: When S get acknowledgement from destination node stop timer, T2
Step 7.4: The expected round trip time is computed as Te = T2 – T 1
          Step 7.5: Source node S sends a packet to destination node 
          Step 7.6: S starts timer TP1
          Step 7.7: When S get acknowledgement from destination node stop timer, TP2
          Step 7.8: The round trip time is calculated as Tr = . TP2 – TP1
          Step 7.9: If  Tr << Te  then inform guard node. 
Step 8: The guard nodes checks  number of packet send by source node PKTSNT (S, D)  
and number of packet receive by destination node PKTRCD(S, D). 
Step 9:  ∆p = PKTSNT (S, D)  - PKTRCD (S, D). 
Step 10: If ∆p > Pth  then inform the source node to stop packet transfer.      
Step 11: The source node stop packet transfer and inform cluster head. 
End. 
4.  PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
A simulation study has been done in MatLab. We have worked with a 30 nodes network while 
the number of packets sent is varied from 1 to 10. The number of guard nodes has been 
increased from 1 to 4. The following are the performance graphs of the network in the presence 
of 1, 2, 3, and 4 guard nodes. 
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Figure 6: Number of packets sent and 
dropped in presence of 3 guard nodes
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Figure 7: Number of packets sent and dropped
in presence of 4 guard nodes 
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Figure 4: Number of packets sent and 
dropped in presence of 1 guard node 
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In figure 4, we observe that in presence of a single guard node, the number of packet drop and 
the number of packet send are nearly the same. So, there is a 50 % improvement in 
performance, with the presence of a single guard node. 
In figure 5, the number of packet send and the number of packet drops vary due to the presence 
of 2 guard nodes. The performance of the network improves further. As evident from figures 6 
and 7, it is observed that as the number of guard node increases to 3 and 4 respectively, the 
number of packets dropped minimizes. The performance of the network increases accordingly. 
Thus, the increase in the number of guard nodes steadily increases the probability of detection 
of wormhole attack. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this work, a new cluster based wormhole detection method has been proposed. In multi-hop 
wireless systems, the need for cooperation among nodes to relay each other's packets exposes 
them to a wide range of security threats including the wormhole attack. A number of recent 
works have been studied before proposing this new methodology. The proposed solution unlike 
some of its predecessors does not require any specialized hardware like directional antennas, etc 
for detecting the attackers.  or extremely accurate clocks, etc. The simulation using 30 nodes 
and variable number of guard nodes prove the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. 
Currently more studies are being done to analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm in 
presence of multiple attacker nodes.   
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